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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation
of the State of Utah, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
UTAH LAKE FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
an unincorporated association; PRO·V:O CITY, a Municipal Corporation of the State of
Utah, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 8078

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an intermediate appeal. The issues for determination are questions of law arising from the pleadings.
They involve ~counterclaims filed by the defendants and respondents which the appellants assert state no ,claim upon
which relief can be granted. Also involved is appellants'
reply, portions of which were strieken by the trial court
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and of which action appellants now complain. The ·case also
involves a ·cross appeal filed by the defendants and respond·
ents raising the question of necessary parties to the action
and a claim of error on the part of the trial court in fail·
ing to strike a portion of the defense interposed thereto by
the plaintiffs and appellants.
The case is a case of major importance, and defendants take the position, as do the appellants, that background
information will probably prove helpful to the Court. The
statement of facts in appellants'. brief goes far afield, even
on the theory of background information. It appears to
. disregard the very pleadings upon which this appeal must
be determined. Appellants cite and quote from cases to
which the respondents were not parties, and which have no
determinative bearing upon the instant case. Respondents,
therefore, find it necessary to comment at length upon the
facts involved in the . instant matter, and those facts ,will
be treated herein under headings which substantially correspond to those set out in the appellants' statement.
The appellants will usually be referred to as plaintiffs
and the respondents and the cross appellants will usually
be referred to as defendants The respondents include all
of the named defendants except defendants W. A. Knight,
H. B. Woodbury, and Ward C. Holbrook, all members of
the Utah Lake Commission. Said members have not answered in any way and counsel appearing herein as attorneys for the defendants do not represent those individuals.
All other defendants have responded.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Geography
The general statements concerning the geography of
Utah Lake set out in appellants' brief are substantially correct. It should be added, however, that hundreds of farmers
own land adjacent to Utah Lake and that the level of the
lake may determine whether those farmers can raise profitable crops or have pasturage or whether the lands will
be flooded and the operations interrupted and the property
destroyed. By virtue of the fact that there is a gradual
incline of the shores of Utah Lake, and because of the shallowness of the lake, a slight variation in the surface elevation of the lake may and does affect hundreds of acres of
surrounding land. It should also be noted that defendant,
Provo City, is the owner of a golf course, airport, a city
park, a boat harbor and club ·house and other properties and
structures of great value, all of which are within the area
affected when the level of the lake rises above the compromise elevation.
of rights to the use of water
from Utah Lake and Jordan River
Devel~pment

Respondents take the position that the appellants' statements concerning the development of rights to the use of
water must be qualified in two material respects, namely:
1. That extent of plaintiffs' water rights are questionable inasmuch as they have never been determined as
against the defendants, and are believed to be grossly overstated.
2. That additional appropriations have been claimed
by the plaintiffs and others since the date of the compro-
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mise agreement, and while appellants assume to operate,
control and administer such additional rights or claims on
the basis of the compromise agreement, they have no authority whatsoever so to do.
Compromise Agreement
Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, the compromise
agreement did not "fully settle" the controversy arising from
the plaintiffs' holding back and storing the water of Utah
Lake. The eompromise agreement ,contemplated liability
on the part of plaintiffs if plaintiffs impounded waters in a
manner ·and to an extent unauthorized by the terms of the
agreement. That premise was recognized in Salt Lake City
vs Colladge, 13 Utah 522, 45 Pac. 891, and in the corrected
decree thereafter entered by the district court pursuant to
the Supreme Court decision. The corrected decree contained the following provision:
"That this deeree shall not in any way prevent the
defendants or any of them from entering suits against
the plaintiffs or any of them for future violations of
the terms of the said contract or of this decree."
Manifestly, there were other unsettled questions concerning the use of Utah Lake by persons or firms not parties to the compromise agreement, or on their behalf, such
as questions eoncerning the maintenance by plaintiff of the
carrying capacity of the river and of the storage of water
not contemplated by the compromise agreement, like transmountain diversions.
Contrary to the assumption and inference contained in
the plaintiffs' statements, compromise agreement was designed not only to protect defendants from lake water in
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excess of compromise elevation but also to afford defendants the use of their lands below that elevation except when
such land was inundated up to eompromise as a result of
practices, structures and operations authorized by the compromise agreement itself.
The Utah Lake ~Commission, eontrary to appellants'
assertions, had no general authority to represent the parties
as agents. The commission's discretionary power extends
only to a determination of weather conditions and times
under which the anticipated run-off would justify holding
back the water in the lake without causing the same to exceed the compromise elevation. The instant ~case does not
involve that discretionary power of the commission, but does
involve unauthorized and ex:cessive obstruction; the holding back of water when the lake was already above compromise, and the question of storage of water not contemplated by the ~compromise agreement, and other related matters. For example, the first paragraph of the compromise
agreement grants the right to maintain the dam in the Jordan River, known as the Jordan Dam, situated at or near
the boundary line between Salt Lake and Utah ~Counties,
as constituted with an opening or water way through said
dam to be left at all times free and open except as hereinafter specified, and also the right free from interference or
liability for damage to flow the lands of the defendants to
the extent that the said dam, above descri~d, may cause
the same to be flowed by the waters of Jordan River, Utah
Lake, o,r otherwise. And, the right to flow the lands of the
said parties to the extent which might be caused by placing obstructions in the water way in said dam according
to the limits therein specified for the purpose of holding
back and retaining the water in Utah Lake at an elevation
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not to exceed 3 ~t 3~ inches above the points theretofore established and recognized as low water mark. The
commission provided for under the agreement was "for the
purpose of better carrying the foregoing into effect.'' The
agreement expressly provided that the board was empowered "as the legally constituted agents of the parties hereto,
to determine and direct when and to what extent obstructions may be placed in the water way of the dam for the
purpose of storing the lake with water for future use not
to exceed the highest elevation hereinafter specified." The
agreement specifies the manner in which the commission
can exercise its authority and limits it in such activities
dependent upon judgment as to the fall of snow and moisture during the winter. It is made clear in the agreement
that the level of the lake cannot be maintained above compromise through manipulation of the dams or by other obstructions placed or permitted in the river. The power of
the commission as agents of the parties is not involved in
this law suit.
The Colladge case
Obviously, excerpts from the decree of the court in
the Colladge case (Salt Lake City vs. Colladge, 13 Utah
522; 45 Pac. 891) must be considered in connection with the
particular issues involved in that case and in the light of
other provisions of the decree The excerpts quoted by the
plaintiffs, whether taken in context or separately, do not
have the effect ascribed them by the plaintiffs. The language of the decree dealing with the right of the plaintiffs
to maintain the water of the lake at ·compromise point must
be ~considered in the light of additional conditions added under the contract and in the light of the provisions of the
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contract and the decree limiting the right to store water in
accordance with the conditions and circumstances therein
specified and prescribed. The language of the Colladge case
referring to the commission as being "constituted the
agents of both parties to the contract" must be considered
in the light of the function of the commission, which certainly would not include the impairment or destruction of
the very rights and limitations expressly established and
provided for in the contract itself.
Appellants, in their brief (pages 7-10), refer to the decree as "very significant construction of compromise agreement as to the purpose, status and power of the Utah Lake
Commission." We are at loss to understand the great significance attached thereto by the appellants, for the reason
that here no claim is made that any obstructions causing
damage during the flooding of 1952 were ordered in by the
commission between O·ctober 1st and the following March
15, or at all. The important phase of the Colladge decision
as far as the issues now before this Court are concerned is
that part dealing with the right of plaintiffs to raise the
sill of Indian Ford Dam by 22 inches because of the alterations by plaintiffs of the channel of the Jordan River after
the compromise agreement had been made and executed.
· After the signing of the compromise agreement and prior
to the decision in the Colladge case, sometime during the
period 1885-1895, a bar in the Jordan River known as "New
Bar" and a bar at the head of the river were removed· by
plaintiffs as a result of dredging operations in the river, and
in the Colladge ease plaintiffs asserted that the "New Dam"
or Indian Ford Dam could be raised 22 inches without obstructing the flow any more than the bars purportedly removed by the plaintiffs would have obstructed the flow.
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The trial court allowed the plaintiffs a raise of 14 inches.
The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to an increase of 22 inches above the original elevation, which said original elevation was six inches below the
sill of the old dam authorized by -compromise agreement.
Neither the '"Old" or "Jordan Dam" nor the "New" or "Indian Ford Dam'' are now in operation. Asswning, however,
that the sills or floors of the dams now used in place of those
dams are not higher than the elevation authorized by the
Colladge decision, the significant point is what has happened
to the Jordan River channel since the plaintiffs secured this
right to raise the floor of the Indian.Ford Dam. The counterclaims allege that plaintiffs, since that time, and particularly during recent years, have permitted other and additional obstructions to fill the river and to retard the flow
thereof. The very premise of the Colladge decision clearly
indicates that since the plaintiffs acquired the right to raise
the dam by reason of the increased carrying capacity of the
river due to the removal of the bars that were in the river,
the plaintiffs by that the very token will be required to relinquish or otherwise compensate for the extra dam height
so acquired when other or similar obstructions have been
permitted to retard the flow of the river. It follows that
the significance of the CoHadge case is not in the respects
claimed by the plaintiffs but establishes the principle that
the effect of the compromise agreement must he determined
in view of matters then existing and then in reasonable contemplation of the parties. The plaintiffs obtained the extra
22 inches because of changes occurring in the bed of the
river subsequent to compromise agreement. When additional obstructions in the river retard the flow and impound
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the waters, the same principle requires a corresponding adjustment in favor of the defendants.
The Morse Decree-The Gardner Case

The decree in Salt Lake City, .et al vs. Salt Lake City
Water and Electric Power Company, et al, 24 Utah 249, 67
Pac. 672, popularly known as the "Morse Decree", did not
involve an action between Utah County landowners and the
Salt Lake County users, but involved only certain claimants in Salt Lake ·County. No defendant in this action was
there involved. Appellants mention the appointment of a
commissioner to "superintend, and direct the measurement
and diversion of all water distributed by this decree in accordance therewith; to direct, supervise and inspect all mains
and appliances for the diversion, conveyance and use of the
same and to report from time to time to the court any violation of the terms of this decree." The powers of the commissioner under the Morse Decree have no effect whatever
on the rights of the Utah County land owners, and cannot
in any way serve to extend the rights of the plaintiffs under compromise agreement, or otherwise, to store water upon the lands of the defendants. The decision of the Supreme
Court in the Morse Decree recognized the limitations of the
compromise agreement upon plaintiffs' right to store water
in Utah Lake (see page 674). That decision is pertinent
only to show the rights of the respective plaintiffs as among
themselves. It cannot and does not purport to have the effect of extending the rights of the plaintiffs as against these
defendants. The decision further holds that since some
Salt Lake County users were not parties to the compromise
agreement, the plaintiffs had no right to hold back their
water in Utah Lake by an impounding dam, ·and it was held
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that the plaintiff would have to let their water by-pass such
dam. The decision e~ressly indicated that the plaintiffs'
rights were subject _to that limitation and "other conditions
contained in the agreement of compromise entered into in
1885 between Joseph H. Colladge and others and the said
city and canal and irrigation companies."
Another case not mentioned by appellants which
touches upon the general problem is Salt Lake City, et al.
vs. Gardner, et al, 3B Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147, which
involved an appeal by the present plaintiffs from the decision of the trial court upholding a subsequent appropriation of water by one not a party to the compromise agreement as against said plaintiffs, and holding that at the time
of such subsequent appropriation the lake contained unappropriated water when the limitations applicable to plaintiffs' rights were considered. The defendants herein were
not parties to that litigation.
Diversion works and measuring devices
in the Jordan River
Plaintiffs seem to rely upon the supplemental decision
in Salt Lake City vs. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company,
43 Utah 591, 137 Pac. 638, to justify their diversion works
and measuring devices in the Jordan River. Neither that
decision or any other decision has authorized the transfer
of the height of the Indian Ford Dam to any other
dams, as bas been attempted ·by the plaintiffs. Nor does
that decision or any other decision since the Colladge case
even purport to govern obstructions in the river as between the plaintiffs and defendants here. It is to be assumed that the diversion and measuring works constructed
pursuant to the decision are satisfactory for diversion of
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water among the Salt Lake City claimants; however, these
works may not be so misused as to obstruct the flow of the
river and cause the level of the lake to rise above the point
limited in the compromise agreement. The supplemental
decision herein mentioned did not involve any of these defendants nor any issue now before this Court The farct
that the structures may have been maintained in the river
for a long period of time has no be·aring upon the issues here,
since defendants ·complain of their effect during unusual
periods of high water and the operation of recent years.
The distinction is pointed out in Peay vs. Salt Lake City, et
al, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac. 206, wherein Peay sued for damages by reason of the unlawful maintenance of structures in the Jordan River and wherein it was held that he
could not recover for the maintenance of structures authorized by compromise agreement unless he amended his complaint and alleged and proved that such structures were
beyond or above those authorized by such agreement.
It may be helpful to the Court at this point to ·clarify
the location of the structures now in the river in relation to
the old structures mentioned in the compromise agreement
and in the eases herein mentioned. The lowest structure on
the river bearing on the issues of this case is the so-called
"diversion dam" of the plaintiffs. This dam is in the northerly portion of the Jordan Narrows just over the line into
Salt Lake County. The canals of the plaintiff canal companies head there. A short distance up stream from said
dam is the site of the "Old" or "Jordan Dam." This is the
original dam placed by plaintiffs or their predecessors and
was utilized both as an impounding and diversion dam. The
compromise agreement refers to the sill of that dam and
stated that it could ·be maintainned as its existing level.
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This dam is referred to as being near the line between Salt
Lake and Utah Counties. Said dam is no longer in existence.
About three-quarters of a mile farther up the river, immediately east of Camp Williams, is the "New" or "Indian Ford
Dam.'' This was a dam constructed in about 1895 to replace the Jordan Dam as an impounding dam. It was the
elevation of the sill of this dam which was determined in
the Colladge case. At least the superstructure of the Indian
Ford Dam has now been removed and the elevation of its
original sill has been sought to be transferred from that dam
to the existing diversion and impounding dam now situated
lower down the river. In addition, the plaintiffs have constructed a dam at the head of the Jordan River. It is the
contention of defendants that both the dam at the head of
the Jordan River, as well as other obstructions caused or
permitted by the plaintiffs in the Jordan River, have, of recent years, been increasingly utilized or permitted to restrict
the flow of water in the river, and have thus been enlarging
the storage of water on the lands of the defendants. The
"New Bar" referred to in the Colladge case was located
about one mile above the Indian Ford Dam Site.
General Adjudication of water rights in Utah Lake,
Jordan River and tributaries
The general adjudication suit referred to by the plaintiff in the statement of facts, Salt Lake City vs. Anderson,
106 Utah 350, 148 Pac. 2d 346, does not involve the same
issues as are in this case, and is not a bar to this proceeding.
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on that question in
Smith vs. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 Pac. 539.
Moreover, even though the present case did involve issues
in common with those in the general adjudication suit, the
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F\ourth Judicial District Court in and for 'Utah County,
would not be thereby deprived of jurisdiction. This was
decided by the Supreme Court in Ernest W. Mitchell vs.
Spanish Fork West Field Inigation Company, et al, - - Utah
, 265 Pac. 2d 1016. Actually, there is little, if
any, connection between these two cases. The general adjudication is for the adjudication of water rights between
the claimants thereto. This case involving entirely different parties partakes more of the elements of trespass and
rights of flowage.
The Water Commissioner appointed pursuant to the
order of the district court functions only in connection with
the distribution of water, and has no power to grant, adjudicate, or withhold flowage rights affecting the lands of
these defendants, or to disregard the limitations applicable
thereto as established by compromise agreement or to disregard the inherent property rights of the defendants.
Outline of issues in present case

Utah Lake, the Jordan River, and the diversion works
for distributing the waters thereof are in some respects one
complete and entire water system as claimed by plaintiffs.
However, as shown by the very case cited by them to sustain this proposition, Salt Lake City vs. Utah and Salt Lake
Canal Co., supra, they are separate in other respects. In that
case the district court's order requiring a sharing of expenses among Salt Lake users for all diversions, on appellants' theory, was reversed. Moreover, while the various
elements mentioned are interrelated in many ways, in orthers
they are separated. Only a part of the Salt Lake ~county
users were parties to compromise agreement, and only a
part were parties to the Colladge ·case. The Utah County
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landowners were not considered sufficiently involved for
plaintiffs to make them parties to Salt Lake City vs. Utah
and Salt Lake Canal Co., supra. Finally, only a part of the
users from Salt Lake County were joined in this suit now
before the Court or were made parties by plruntiffs herein.
If in ·an respects the whole system is inseverable and all
probJems must be handled in unit fashion, as plaintiffs infer, this Court must declare that plaintiffs have failed to
join indispensable parties such as the numerous other claimants using Jordan River Water ·and not parties to compromise agreement and not now joined by plaintiffs herein.
The only reason this may not be so is because the rights
are separable, but certainly, on any theory, plaintiffs cannot
control the diversions of these other parties by plaintiffs'
dams and other obstructions as they have done and are doing without being responsible in this lawsuit themselves,
apart from the question of whether they should have joined
other parties or not.
Ever since shortly after compromise agreement was
reached the plaintiffs have endeavored, on one pretext or
another, to raise the elevation of compromise point so as
to make it possible for them to store increased amounts of
water on .defendants' lands. In the Colladge case itself,
the original pleadings show that the plaintiffs' major contention was that compromise point was 3 feet 31/2 inches
above the "meander line" of Utah Lake, rather than above
low watermarks as fixed in the compromise agreement and
as tied to the red sandstone at the head of the Jordan River.
This contention, after the originai answers of the defendco
ants in the Colladge case, relying upon the red sandstone
mark, were filed, was abandoned by plaintiffs in the Colladge !case, and the claim with respect to the lowering of the
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bars in the river as a basis for raising their dam was introduced by plaintiffs by way of amendment to the original
complaint. (See abstract of record in the Colladge case on
file in the library of this Court).
As shown by paragraph 11 of the second defense in this
case, after the destruction of the Snail Island monwnent,
which plaintiffs were charged by the decree in the ·Colladge
case with maintaining, the plaintiffs made further attempts
to raise compromise point. Up to 1945 a gauge mark located at the pumping plant at the head of the Jordan River
in the vicinity of the original monument, and a gauge at
Pelican Point, on the western shore of the lake, and other
gauges on or near the lake were used to check and record
the level of Utah Lake with reference to compromise point.
All of said gauges up to 1945 were established, maintained
and based up on the said stone monwnent near the head
of the Jordan River and fixed compromise point at four
feet six inches below the top of this original monwnent.
In that year or in 1946, however, the association of plaintiff companies, known as the Association of Canal Presidents, raised the gauges .32 of a foot, so that the compromise elevation recorded as compromise point and acted upon
by the Commissioner of Utah Lake, retained as consulting
engineer by such association, was in effect thereby raised
correspondingly without the consent of the defendants.
Thereafter, representatives of the State Engineer's O·ffice,
as defendants allege, without any authority whatsoever,
and contrary to the rights of the defendants and those similarly situated, asswned to again raise said gauges .21 of a
foot higher. Now, by the present legal action, plaintiffs are
attempting, in effect, to again raise compromise point higher than the points involved in the previous attempts, that
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is, to a total of more than six and a ·half inches above the
point originally designated as compromise point, as defendants claim.
There are other background circumstances which must
be considered in order to understand the issues in this case.
Between the time of the filing of the complaint in this case
and the time defendants' answers were filed, August 22,
1952, Utah County had experienced one of the most disastrous floods in the history of the valley from a rise in the
waters of Utah Lake. Large areas of farm land belonging
to the defendants and those similarly situated had been inundated, crops of 1952 destroyed, and the productivity of
the land impaired for future years. Provo Airport, the
Provo Boat Harbor and House, and many other improvements and recreational facilities of Provo City were completely surrounded and in some instances covered with water, and it was only by almost superhuman last-minute efforts and an outlay of a large amount of money by Provo
City, that the dike protecting the Provo Airport was saved
at all.
The defendants, when confronted with plaintiffs' suit,
by which plaintiffs sought the right to store additional water upon their land, determined that all matters going to
the storage, and the resulting damage, including plaintiffs'
violation of -compromise agreement by the maintenance of
unauthorized obstructions in the river; the failure to keep
the river, so adopted as the private channel for water
claimed by plaintiffs, in an unobstructed condition; the holding back of water not contemplated by compromise agreement and for interests not parties to compromise agreement;
and all other matters properly going to the plaintiffs' rights
to store water on the lands of the defendants should be in-
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terposed as a permissive counterclaim and would probably
have to be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim at the
risk of having such claims forever barred should this
not be done. Certainly it appeared that a counterclaim
could be filed by the named defendants sued by plglltiffs
individually, and it appeared reasonable that those sued as
representatives of all of the owners of land surrounding Utah
Lake could counterclaim on their behalf by reason of such
representation, since to hold otherwise will necessitate the
filing of hundreds of individual suits for damages, contrary,
it would seem, to the spirit of the new Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The counterclaims in addition to the allegations of the
answers and affirmative defenses preceding them, set out
on behalf of the defendants individually named and all others in a slmilar situation, the facts claimed by them concerning the lands involved; their value when clear of water;
the damage which inundation or saturation causes; the contemplation of compromise agreement that only natural
drainage and snow and rain run-off from this watershed
would be held back in Utah Lake; the subsequent transmountain diversions and plaintiffs' acts and claims with respect to the storage thereof; the new claims to wate~r initiated by plaintiffs and others since compromise agreement
was entered into and the wrongful claim of plaintiffs that
compromise agreement covers them. It is further alleged
that plaintiffs have wrongfully raised or caused to be raised
the gauges by means of which the permissible levels of Utah
Lake have been dete~rmined. It is further alleged that the
channel of Jordan River has been adopted by plaintiffs as
a private channel for the. transportation of their water and
that in effect their rights under compromise agreement are
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based upon said channel being kept clear except as to obstructions expressly authorized by compromise agreement.
It is alleged that in recent years, and particularly just prior
to flooding complained of, there were landslides along the
Jordan River which materially obstructed the flow of water
and raised ·the level of Utah Lake, and that plaintiffs have
failed, neglected and refused to clean out said channel. It
is further alleged that during previous years, to increase
carry-over water, and after October 1st, 1951, and during
1952 to the present time, the plaintiffs without right or authority and in violation of the terms of compromise agreement, caused planks and other obstructions to be placed and
maintained in the Jordan River and have maintained dams
without the openings required by said compromise agreement, and that even while the level of Utah Lake was far
above compromise point during the year 1952 and with unprecedented runoffs in Utah Lake anticipated and experienced, the plaintiffs, without authority or right, continued
to so obstruct said Jordan River, thereby unreasonably and
wrongfully retarding the flow of water from Utah Lake and
causing large areas of valuable iand surrounding Utah Lake
belonging to defendants and those similarly situated to be
and remain inundated, to the great and irreparable damage
of the owners thereof. '
It is further alleged that by reason of the matters set
out and referred to in the answers and counterclaims and
the matters set out in the complaint, a dispute has arisen as
to the location of compromise point and as t~ the monuments determining the same; as to the rights of the plaintiffs to store foreign and other waters in Utah Lake and
concerning the level at which the waters of said lake may
be maintained; as to the effect of the compromise agree-
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ment upon property owners adjacent to Utah Lake and as
to responsibilities of the plaintiffs, in using Jordan River as
a private channel, to keep said channel clear of obstructions; as to the rights of plaintiffs to maintain planks or
other obstructions in said river and in plaintiffs' dams and
as to whether said dams in their present state are authorized by said compromise agreement; as to the liability of
plaintiffs to defendants and those similarly situated for damages from flooding; and as to the other matters set out and
referred to in the counterclaim; also that it is necessary
that the Court declare the rights of the respective parties
concerning all these matters in order to avoid a great multiplicity of suits, to permit the proper administration of the
waters of Utah Lake, and to avoid further irreparable injury to the defendants and others similarly situated.
In addition to a declaration of rights, injunctive relief
restraining the plaintiffs and those in privity with them
from committing or suffering any of the acts or conditions
complained of is sought. It is further alleged that by reason of the unlawful and improper storage of waters upon
the lands of defendants and other persons similarly situated
and the unlawful flooding, inundation and saturation of their
lands, the named defendants, and other persons similarly
situated, have suffered damages of more than $950,000.00.
It is further alleged that until the various elements of right
and liability are herein determined, and because of the large
number of claimants in the same position as the defendants
named, it is impracticable to make specific claims on the
part of each claimant except defendant, Provo ~City, for damages at this time, but that it is reasonable, proper and necessary that the Court retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
entertaining and adjudicating, either directly or through
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a master, specific claim for damages in favor of the other
named defendants, and all other persons similarly situated,
after a determination and declaration by this Court of the
various elements of liability as against the plaintiffs and of
the respective rights of the parties.
As pointed out by appellants, the trial court granted defendants' motion to strike certain portions of plaintiffs' reply to the counterclaims of defendants, and also a portion
of plaintiffs' answer to the affidavit of defendants for a preliminary injunction. Since the latter ruling involves one
of the points involved in the first mentioned ruling, and since
the matter of a preliminary injunction, after the subsiding
of the flood, was continued without date and has probably
become moot, we shall not specially note this matter hereafter.

Upon the· filing of the petition for an intermediate appeal by plaintiffs, the defendants, without waiving any of
matters set out in their answer to the petition for intermediate appeal, but for consideration by the Court in the
event it should determine that plaintiffs raised questions of
which the ·Court finds it should take jurisdiction, for the
purposes of an intermediate appeal, asked this Court to consider the following matters:
1. That on or about the 15th day of November, 1951,
after the plaintiffs' complaint on file herein had been filed
with the ·court and served upon the named defendants, the
named defendants filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground,
among others, that there were indispensable parties omitted
by plaintiffs, and for the reason that the defendants named
were not proper representation of all persons similarly situated or interested in the lands surrounding Utah Lake.
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2. On or about the 14th day of December, 1951, the
trial court denied defendants' motion, which order of the
court is as follows:
"Defendants' motion to dismiss having been argued
to the court and the eourt having taken the question
presented thereby under advisement, and having examined the statutes, rules and authorities touching the
questions presented, and being now fully informed, ordered that the said motion be, and the same is hereby,
denied and overruled, without prejudice, however, to
the defendants art any time during the pendency of the
cause, to raise the question either as a matter of law
or fact, as to whether or not the named parties defend. ant do, or do not, constitute proper representation of
all the owners of titles to, or interest in, lands likely to
be affected by the relief sought in the eomplaint on file
herein. It is further ordered that a copy of this minute
be transmitted by the clerk of the ·court to respective
counsel for the parties."
If the affirmative defenses and counterclaims of
these defendants are held not to be properly maintainable
herein as class actions, then the trial court erred in denying
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the
ground that the plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties; failed to join all parties having a joint interest in the
subject matter as required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; failed to join all parties owning or interested in
land bordering Utah Lake who ·would be severely affected
by a change in the level thereof; failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 19 (~c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
and the plaintiffs' action was not a proper class action within the ·contemplation of Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

4. That if it be ·held that for purposes of these defendants' affirmative defense to the complaint, and their counterclaim, or as argued by the plaintiffs in suppo·rt of their
petition for an intermediate appeal herein, that this action
will affect users of water from Utah Lake other than the
named defendants herein, then the trial court erred in denying defendants said motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. In such event
this Court should declare that plaintiffs have failed to join
indispensable parties in that they have failed to join such
other users of the waters of Utah Lake of whose claims in
the office of the State Engineer the Court will take judicial
notice. These users would be affected by a determination
herein of compromise point as sought in plaintiffs' complaint, in that any storage they make would be under the
plaintiffs herein and subject to the ·control of Utah Lake hy
the plaintiffs.
5. In plaintiffs' reply to defendants' counterclaim, they
alleged as their purported tenth defense that "the claims
asserted by the said defendants in said counterclaim and
the issues made by said counterclaim are such as are not
subject to determination and adjudication in the action."
That the defendants moved to strike said purported defense
and the trial court denied said motion. Error was thereby
committed by the trial oo~.
6. That each and all of the errors herein above specified are at least as fundamental to the rights of the parties
and to the public interest, and probably more so, than the
alleged errors claimed in plaintiffs' petition (for intermediate appeal); that their consideration by this Court upon intermediate appeal would be equally as vital as the consideration of any other problems raised by their appeal and would
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be equally, or more, helpful to the trial court when consid-

ering the merits as would be a determination of any points
raised by the plaintiffs in their petition for an intermediate
appeal.

Based upon these factors, defendants' cross petition
for intermediate appeal asked that if plaintiffs' petition were
granted in whole or in part the Court include among the
issues to be considered on such intermediate appeal (1)
whether plaintiffs' action is properly maintainable as a class
action; (2) whether plaintiffs have failed to name indispensable parties, either plaintiff or defendant; (3) whether
the defendants, as a class or by reason of their representation, by, or in the name of, .Utah Lake Farmers Association,
may have their claims adjudicated under the counterclaim
herein, and (4) whether the individual landowners who are
not specifically named by plaintiffs as parties defendant
must file individual, separate and independent actions for
their damages or for the other relief to which they may be
entitled.
-The Supreme Court of Utah, in its order of November
2, 1953, granted, at least in part, the petition for intermedi-

ate appeal in the following language:
"The petition for an interlocutory appeal by plaintiffs herein having been considered, it is ordered that
an interlocutory appeal be granted from the orders entered on the 27th day of June, 1953, by the District
Court of Utah County, granting defendants' motion to
strike certain portions from plaintiffs' replies and granting defendants' motion to strike certain portions from
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit and petition
for a preliminary injunction."

1
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Literally the order seems to indicate that the plaintiffs
petition for intermediate appeal, ex:cept as to the rulings on
the motions to strike there involved, was denied, and this
would in such event make impertinent plaintiffs' argument
that the court erred in failing to dismiss defendants' counterclaim. The foregoing order, limited by its terms to
the petition for intermediate appeal by plaintiffs, does not
purport to cover the cross petition for a consideration of
other points by the defendants, and apparently a ruling on
this cross petition has not been expressly made. However,
we hope that since the matters are closely related, and because a consideration by this Court of all of the basic matters of law that may be involved at the trial will be most
helpful to the parties and the trial court, this Court will
consider both the matter of plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the
counterclaims and the matters mentioned above in connection with defendants' cross appeal. This, among other
things, will permit appropriate amendments to the pleadings if such are indicated, and will permit the numerous
land owners to bring their separate suits against the plaintiffs on the subject matter of the counterclaims herein, within the period of the statute of limitations, should it be held
that they ·cannot secure redress by reason of the representation of the defendants individually named by plaintiffi
as representative of the class.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. Defendants' counterclaims are valid claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as valid claims on
behalf of the defendants individually named, and are valid
claims for damages to be established by numerous persons
who the plaintiffs allege are members of a class in a sim-
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ilar situation. The trial court properly refused to dismiss
said counterclaim, and the action of the trial court in so
refusing to dismiss was correct.
2. There was no error on the part of the trial court
in striking from plaintiffs' replies the third and fourth purported defenses therein contained, for the reason that laches
and estoppel, under applicable rules, must be specifically
pleaded. There is nothing pleaded in said purported defenses tending to show that the authorities cited are binding
as an estoppel, or otherwise, upon these defendants or that
the matter therein alleged as estoppel or laches relate to
any point complained of by the defendants.
3. The trial court did not err in striking the purported
fifth defense since obviously the claim of adverse user was
sham and frivolous, since the lake reached such high stage
only once in every decade or so, and since the defendants
were not complaining of any act authorized by the compromise agreement.
4. The trial court did not err in striking the plaintiffs'
tenth defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo City,
and the eleventh defense to the counterclaim of the other
defendants, for the reason that under the rules of civil precedure the claim is certainly one pleadable as a permissive
counterclaim and, in all probability, the counterclaim is mandatory. The individual defendants clearly have the right
to plead the counterclaim on their own behalf, and since they
are also named as representatives of a class, and in order
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in view of common issues,
a counterclaim for and in behalf of the unnamed defendants
should be interposed for their damages as well as for declarative and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs having relied upon
the class representation to afford the jurisdiction to pro-
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ceed are estopped from questioning the representation in
connection with the counterclaims. The plaintiffs' position
ignores the pleadings before the court which show that the
acts complained ·of are directly the acts of the plaintiffs,
and there is nothing to show or to establish that the Utah
Lake Commissioner or any other officer has any interest
in compromise agreement or can assent any power in connection therewith except for and at the behest of the plaintiffs.. If plaintiffs claim there are other parties in interest
to this proceeding or any phase thereof, it should be their
duty to make them parties to the proceeding.
5. The trial court did not err in striking plaintiffs'
twelfth defense to the counterclaim of the Utah County farmers for the reasons stated under point 4, and for the additional reason that the authority relied upon by plaintiffs
deals with problems arising prior to the new rules of civil
procedure, and for the reason that, in any event, there is
a unity of interest among the defendants as a ~class. With
respect to the -complaint for damageS, there. are adequate
means in this suit to permit individual claims to be filed
and adjudication based upon common interests and common
rights with a great saving of time and expense, and thereby
to avoid a multipUcity of suits in the interest of all parties
concerned, as well as in the interest of the courts of the
State of Utah.
6. The trial court did not err in striking the plaintiffs'
eleventh defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo
City, and plaintiffs' thirteenth defense to the counterclaim
of the other Utah County landowners. The plaintiff initiated the action going into the question of storage in Utah
Lake, and if new parties, not named by the plaintiff, are
indispensable the plaintiff should be required to bring them
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in. As far as the counterclaims are concerned, we are seeking an adjudication of rights between plaintiffs and defendants as a class, and the defendants individually named, and
if plaintiffs wish an adjudication involving other parties, it is
their responsibility to see that those interests are brought
into the proceeding. The State Engineer has no interest
whatever in these issues, and since the plaintiffs did not
wish to make the State Engineer a party they may not now
complain thereof.
7. The trial court did not err in striking plaintiffs'
twelfth defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo
City, and fourteenth defense to the counterclaim of the other defendants for the reason that the general adjudication
proceeding referred to is not a bar to the suit involving such
issue as construction of eontracts, trespass and the flowage
rights. Smith vs. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256
Pac. 2d 539; Mitchell vs. Spanish Fork Westfield Irrigation
Company, et al, 69 Utah 493, 265 Pac. 2d 1016.
8. The trial court did not err in striking portions from
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit for a preliminary
injunction for the reason that such matters were not binding upon these defendants, or any of them, and were nort
material to this proceeding for the reason stated in connection with other points herein treated and, in any event, such
question is now probably moot.
9. If the Supreme Court should determine that such
counterclaims are not maintainable as a class action for and
in behalf of the unnamed defendants, then, and in that event,
the Court should eonsider defendants' cross petition for intermediate appeal, and the Court should determine that the
district court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for the reason that the complaint did not name in-
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dispensible parties and the plaintiffs, in such event, should
be required to name all individuals and other interests concerned in the question of the level of Utah Lake, so that they
will have a standing in court to counterclaim for declaratory, injunctive and other relief, including damages, arising
in connection therewith.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1
In their brief, on page 19, plaintiffs set forth only paragraph 15 of defendants' counterclaim, and then assert that
the counterclaim should be dismissed on four grounds, namely: (1) Because one of the dams complained of was installed in the river under an order of the District Court
for Salt Lake County in 1914; (2) Because the plaintiffs
claim the right to flow the lands of defendants up to compromise point at all times, irrespective of the source of the
water; (3) Because a Water Commissioner appointed by
the State Engineer has charge of the distribution of the
water among the various claimants; and, (4) Because the
Jordan River is a natural channel and authority to remove
obstacles therefrom is vested in the Board of County Commissioners. In this brief defendants will treat these points
in the order above named.
At the outset it must be noted that plaintiffs have merely refe~rred to one of the allegations of the complaint and
have picked a few isolated facts, without mention of many
others, whi,ch they want the Court to find and interpret
against defendants. They cite no statutes or decided cases
whieh preclude the counterclaims.
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Paragraph 15 of the counterclaims, referred to on page
19 of plaintiffs' brief, is simply one of many allegations contained in the ·counterclaims as a basis for defendants' claim.
In essence, all of the allegations emphasize the fact that the
plaintiffs have used the Jordan River just as freely as they
would one of their own canals. The counterclaim alleges
that the plaintiffs have placed dams and obstructions in the
river contrary to compromise agreement; that they have
changed the natural course of the river; that they have elevated gauging devices on .Utah Lake and have otherwise
wilfully and knowingly, caused the waters of the lake to
be impounded therein to the damage of these defendants.
Plaintiffs, in effect, ask the Court to disregard all of defendants' allegations except paragraph 15 and to rule as
a matter of law that that paragraph is vitiated and rendered
innocuous because the particular dam therein referred to
was allegedly installed under a court order.
Plaintiffs do not allege nor do they contend that these
defendants were parties to the proceedings they rely upon.
None of the defendants were parties and no order issued
as a result of such proceedings could be binding as against
these defendants. TaDJ)jer vs. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 Utah
158; 2 P. 2d 107. In that ease it was held that a decree was
·not binding upon one who was not a party to the action,
either directly or through his predecessor, even though he
might be interested in the subject matter thereof. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege nor anywhere eootend that
the dam in question cannot be used as an impounding device
to hold back the waters in Utah Lake. The fact is that the
dam in question is so designed that it can, by a simple adjustment to the gates, stop the flow of the river, and that
carries with it the power to cut down or retard the flow of
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the river. Even though the dam structure itself, when the
gates are properly open, may be harmless to these defendants, it would indeed be anomalous to hold that these defendants are precluded by a court order in a proceeding to
which they were not parties or bound, from raising the question of improper operation of dam to the defendants' great
damage. The ·compromise agreement preserves the right
of the defendants to bring any suits against the plaintiffs
or any of them for any future violations of the agreement
or of the decree in the Colladge case. Salt Lake City v. Colladge, 13 Utah 522, 45 Pac. 891.
Plaintiffs assert that they have the right to flow defendants' land up to compromise elevation at all times, irrespective of the source of water, and in support of their position
quote one sentence from compromise agreement (Plaintiffs'
Brief, page 24). The next sentence of the agreement shows
the limited application of the sentence quoted by plaintiffs.
It provides as follows:
"Also the right in addition to the foregoing, free
from liability or damage, to flow the lands of the parties of the first part, or either of them, to the extent
which may be caused by placing obstructions in the
water way in said dam hereinbefore mentioned according to tne limitation hereinafter specified for the purpose of holding back or retarding the waters in Utah
Lake at an elevation or height not to exceed 3 feet 3¥2
inches above the points heretofore established as low
water mark in said lake (compromise)***." (1)
The sentence relied upon by plaintiffs gives them storage rights only to the extent that the waters of the Jordan
River are retarded by the bottom of the dam as then con( 1)

Emphasis ours.
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structed, plus 6 inches (Compromise Agreement). In other
words, under that provision plaintiffs were protected only
if the Jordan River was permitted its almost then free flow.
The subsequent sentence above set forth in this brief makes
the question of whether other obstructions can be placed
in the river dependent upon whether or not the fall of snow
during the past winter has been heavy or light. (See Compromise agreement). Obviously, the agreement relative to
snow fall contemplated only the natural drainage area of
Utah Lake. It was not and could. not have been in the eontemplation of the parties that water from foreign watersheds would be brought into Utah Lake for storage, and
that other waters or sources of water, then unknown, would
be tapped and stored in Utah Lake by the plaintiffs and
others in privity with the plaintiffs. The grant of an easement contemplates the then known factors and uses only.
Defendants are not seeking damages arising more than three
years before the filing of the counterclaim, but we are primarily seeking to recover damages for 1952 and to prevent
any recurrences of damages by unlawful flowage of defendants' lands in future years.
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the distribution
of the waters of Utah Lake and the Jordan River have been
under the supervision of a commissioner appointed by the
court in 1914, and later by a commissioner appointed by
the State Engineer. The function of the Water ·Commission appointed by the court in 1914 in a proceeding to which
these defendants were not parties, was stated by the court
in Salt Lake City, et al., vs. Salt Lake City Water and Electric Power Company, et al., 24 Utah 249; 67 P . .672, as follows:
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"**To superintend and direct the measurement
and division of all water, distributed by this decree in
accordance therewith; to direct and supervise and inspect all means and appliance for the diversion, conveyance, and use of the same,****".
The only responsibility of the Water Commission is to
see that the claimants of the water receive, by accurate
measurements, the waters awarded to them. The so-called
"Morse Decree," as pointed out in plaintiffs' brief (pages
10 and 12), involved only the right of the users of water in
Salt Lake County, and dealt only with the problem of the
maintenance of some proper fracility for measuring and distributing the waters as awarded under the decree. The
compromise agreement and storage rights involving the interest of these defendants was not an issue in the proceedings. Moreover, these plaintiffs have neglected to point out
to the C·ourt that the Water ·Commissioner is also retained
by the plaintiffs as a consulting engineer. The Water c~om
missioner has no right, by any authority whatever, in the
exercise of his duties as such, to interfere with the flow of
the river contrary to the provisions of the compromise
agreement. Nor can these plaintiffs hide behind the Water
Commissioner in the operation of a dam devised and built
by them in the guise of a diversionary works but so installed
and constituted that it ·can be used as an impounding dam,
and the water taken by plaintiffs when they want it.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Jordan River is a
natural channel, and that the right to remove natural obstacles therefrom is vested in the Board of County Commissioners. Plaintiffs thus seek refuge in a statutory provision
giving County Commissioners a power to do something if
the Commission desires to exercise it. There is nothing
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mandatory in the language quoted, nor can it be assumed
therefrom that power to remove natural obstacles is limited
to the county. It should also be noted that the power granted to counties is only exercisable in connection with "natural" obstacles. Defendants complain not only about slides
that have been permitted to retard the flow of the river
which might be ~called "natural" obstacles, but defendants
also complain about obstacles and changes attributable directly to the efforts of the plaintiffs. The plain fact of the
matter is, as the evidence will show, these plaintiffs have
taken over the Jordan River as completely as they could
if it were a private ·channel. They have, without consulting
anyone, placed dams and obstructions as they saw fit; they
have changed the natural course of the river as they desired;
they have left the old Indian Ford Dam, except the superstructure thereof, in the river; they have set up pumping
apparatus as fit their whims, they have elevated gauge
heights which were designed to show the level of the lake
in relation to 'Compromise; they have removed obstructions
that it suited their purpose to remove and have left others
that it suited their purposes to leave. The plaintiffs dredged
the river and then claimed and secured the right to increase
the dam height. That increase carries with it the duty on
the part of the plaintiffs to see that the river does at all
times carry the water it purportedly carried at the time
they secured the rights to raise the level of their dam.
It is understandable that the plaintiffs would like to
have the counterclaim dismissed on some alleged technicality. However, as determined by the trial judge, these
conjectures of the plaintiffs do not furnish basis for such
dismissal, and the counterclaim sh·ould be heard by the
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Court and a determination should then be made upon the
merits of the evidence.
POINT 2
Plaintiff ·claims that the trial tourt erred in striking
their third and fourth defenses to the counterclaim.
The third defense is premised upon the fact that the
so-called "diversion works" in the Jordan Narrows were
installed pursuant to a decree of the District Court for Salt
Lake County entered February 13, 1914. As heretofore
pointed out, none of these defendants were parties to the
proceeding in que8tion, and could not be bound by any decision therein rendered. Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Co.,
supra. The trial court so held, and the plaintiffs have not
been able to cite any decided ·case or authority to bolster
their claim. Plaintiffs' purported third defense does not
state a defense by way of estoppel, or on any other basis.
The defendants are not dependent upon the Utah Lake
and Jordan Dam Commission to protect their rights. The
Colladge case, supra, expressly points out that the decree
"Shall not in any way prevent the defendants or any of them
from bringing any suits against the plaintiffs or any of them
for any future violation of the terms of the said contract
(Compromise Agreement) or of this decree." The claims
of defendants are based upon violations of the compromise
agreement.
The fourth defense, which the plaintiffs claim was erroneously stricken, appears to a claim of laches. Like estoppel, laches must be specifically pleaded. Plaintiffs pleaded mere conclusions. Plaintiffs cite no authority whatever
for their contention.
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POINT 3

Under this point plaintiffs contend that the court erred
in striking their fifth defense to the defendants' counterclaim.
That defense ·claims a prescriptive right to flow the defenda proceedants' lands and again cites the Morse Decree
ing to which none of the defendants were parties, as authority. The defense itself states that the lands have been
flowed "at such times and under such conditions as specified and set forth under compromise agreement." In other
words, they claim a prescriptive right to comply with compromise agreement. The plain fact is that the claimed defense just doesn't state a defense at all. A permissive use
cannot mature into a right through adverse possession, nor
c~n an adverse right be acquired if the claimed adverse use ·
is of irregular or infrequent occurrence. 56 Am. Jur. 768
and 772. Moreover, recovery for trespass is not barred because perchance there have been previous, long separated,
trespasses.
POINT 4

Plaintiffs argue that the counterclaims are not subject
to determination and adjudication in this proceeding. It is
their position that only the compromise elevation question
can be ·considered, because on that question the rights of
the parties will turn. That proposition is not the fact at all.
Plaintiffs and defendants are in dispute over a difference
in compromise level of between 6 and 7 inches over the surface of the lake. The defendants, however, have alleged in
their ·counterclaims that the plaintiffs were responsible for
the rise in the water of the lake to an elevation of several
feet above compromise. Therefore, even if compromise
point should be determined to be where plaintiffs claim it
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is, there remains the question of the unlawful flooding by
the plaintiffs in excess of that elevation. Hence the counterclaim is not ·contingent for its total failure or success upon the outcome of the compromise level question. This case
is then clearly distinguishable from the authority cited by
plaintiffs. Even though the Court holds that the counterclaims cannot be maintained as a class action upon the issue
of damages, this would only make in order an amendment
to enlarge the allegations as to class representation or an
order that the additional numerous defendants be brought
in personally, as the rules permit.
There can be no escape from the fact that defendants
Provo City and the other named defendants are in this law
suit in their own individual capacity, even though they
may also be labeled, in addition, as representatives of a class.
So far as Pro¥o City is concerned, there can be no question
but that the counterclaim is so stated as to entitle it to judgment upon default of the plaintiffs. Even if plaintiffs prevail in their principal action, the counterclaim here stated
will not fall for that reason alone, as was the situation in
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Coffelt, 11
Fed. Rules Dec, 443, cited as authority by the plaintiffs.
Other authorities ·cited by plaintiff are not in point. Taylor
v. E. M. Royle Corp., a Utah case at 264 P. 2d 279, was a
suit on a contract where recovery was allowed under quantum meruit, and where the court held that the defendants
had not had an opportunity to meet the issue.
POINT 5
Here plaintiffs attempt to avoid the impact of the counterclaim by the Utah Lake Farmers Association and individual defendants, except Provo City, by asserting that the
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individual claims for damages cannot lJe determined or adjudicated in a class action. They rely upon Nunnely et al.
v. First Federal Bldg. & Loan Assoc. of Ogd,en, et al., 107
Utah 347, 154 P. 2d 620, 107 Utah 379, 159 P. 2d 141, a Utah
case decided prior to the adoption of the New Utah Ruies
of Civil Procedure. That case permitted the plaintiffs therein, in effect, to proceed with their class action, or in representative form, up to a point where it became necessary to
establish the validity of the individual claims. Then each
individual claimant should be given an opportunity to come
into the suit and claim the benefits thereof up to that point.
Defendants in this case see no reason whatever why the
same rationale should not apply in this instance, especially
in view of the adoption of the New Rules. Even under the
old practice it was decided in Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339,
135 P. 2d 251, that a counterclaim for ordinary relief was
proper in declaratory judgment action.
POINT 6
By their argument under this point plaintiffs asse·rt
that there are other additional indispensable parties to the
adjudication of the counterclaim who are not necessary parties to the action instituted by plaintiffs. The arguments
of plaintiffs are specious and with no particularity whatever,
and are not supported by any authority whatever. Defendants are not required to join all joint-tort feasors in any
event. If plaintiffs claim indispensaJble parties, they can
bring them in. These defendants were not parties to any
proceeding giving the Water Commissioner power or authority to regulate the flow of the Jordan River. Plaintiffs do not
specify the additional parties whom they claim should be
brought in. Their pleading is insufficient in that respect,
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because it should specify particularly the names of those
deemed by them to be indispensable, so that the Court could
act upon the information so presented and make a specific
order as to those particular parties. (See URCP 19).
POiNT 7

This point raises the question as to whether the instant case involving alleged flooding of defendants' land by
the plaintiffs in this action must be held in abeyance pending the outcome of a general adjudication proceeding. Salt
Lake City v. Anderson, 106 Utah 350, 148 P. 2d 346. The
issues are not even 'Contended to ·be identical or inter-dependent. The Supreme Court of Utah, in Mitchell vs. Spanish
Fork Westfield Irrigation Company, 265 P. 2d 1016, completely disposes of the question by holding that a general
adjudication proceeding does not have the effect argued
by the plaintiffs herein. Also, in Smith v. District Court
supra, the question was decided adversely to plaintiffs' contention. There the Supreme Court held that a general adjudication suit pending was not a bar because other questions were involved and other relief sought which were
not involved in the general adjudication proceeding.
POINT 8
The trial court did not err in striking portions from
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit for preliminary
injunction, for the reason that the matters therein stricken
were not binding on these defendants, as has been previously herein pointed out. The matters stricken were redundant and absolutely immaterial as far as these defendants and the case is concerned. In any event, the point is
now moot.
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POINT 9
Prior to the filing of the answers and counterclaims
these defendants moved the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint for the reason that it failed to include indispensable parties parties, both plaintiff and defendant, and that
the named defendants were not representative of the class,
and for ther reasons. The trial court denied that motion.
Defendants raised the problem in this appeal by their cross
appeal on file herein.
Defendants take the position that if the Court should
determine that the unnamed defendants are not entitled to
have the damage question maintained as a ·class action, then
the Court should also determine that the trial court erred in
refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as requested by the
named defendants. In such event the plaintiffs should be
required to name all individuals concerned with the level
of the water of Utah Lake so that they will have a standing
in Court to ~counterclaim for declaratory, injunctive and
other relief, including damages, arising from the flooding
of their lands.
As we have pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the
order of the Court permitting the intermediate appeal seems
to have been limited. We hope, however, that since all of
these matters are so closely related, and because a decision
would be helpful to the parties and to the trial court, this
Court will consider defendants' cross appeal if it determines
that the damage question ·cannot be maintained as a class
action. A decision thereon will permit the numerous landowners to bring their separate suits against the plaintiffs on
the subject matter of the counterclaim within the period of
the statute of limitations should it be held that they cannot

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
secure redress through representation by the named defendants up to the point where it becomes necessary to establish the amount of their individual damages.
CONCLUSION

The counterclaims filed by the defendants are proper
claims for declaratory, injunctive and other relief, including
the actual damages of the named defendants, and as a basis
for proof of the actual damages of the unnamed defendants
at a later stage in the proceeding. The defenses interposed
by the plaintiffs, which were stricken by the trial court,
were all redundant and immaterial and not binding on any
defendant in this action. If the unnamed landowners do
not have any standing before the trial court with respect
to the question of their individual damages, the trial court
erred in refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for their
failure to bring in indispensable parties, and the plaintiffs
should be required to bring each individual in as a party,
so that there can be a full adjudication of all rights in this
action.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Defendants, Utah
Lake Farmers Association, et al.,

and
CLAIR M. ALDRICH,
of Aldrich & Bullock,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Provo City.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

